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Abstract.  A few decades of work in the AI field have focused 
efforts on developing a new generation of systems which can 
acquire knowledge via interaction with the world. Yet, until very 
recently, most such attempts were underpinned by research 
which predominantly regarded linguistic phenomena as 
separated from the brain and body. This could lead one into 
believing that to emulate linguistic behaviour, it suffices to 
develop ‘software’ operating on abstract representations that will 
work on any computational machine. This picture is inaccurate 
for several reasons, which are elucidated in this paper and extend 
beyond sensorimotor and semantic resonance. Beginning with a 
review of research, I list several heterogeneous arguments 
against disembodied language, in an attempt to draw conclusions 
for developing embodied multisensory agents which 
communicate verbally and non-verbally with their environment. 
Without taking into account both the architecture of the 
human brain, and embodiment, it is unrealistic to replicate 
accurately the processes which take place during language 
acquisition, comprehension, production, or during non-linguistic 
actions. While robots are far from isomorphic with humans, they 
could benefit from strengthened associative connections in the 
optimization of their processes and their reactivity and 
sensitivity to environmental stimuli, and in situated human-
machine interaction. The concept of multisensory integration 
should be extended to cover linguistic input and the 
complementary information combined from temporally 
coincident sensory impressions.1 
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resonance, language, multisensory integration, robotics 
1 INTRODUCTION 
… His eyes only see 
His ears only hear … 
— No End of Fun (1967) 
 
In the ‘traditional’ view, going back to René Descartes, 
cognition has been seen as manipulation of symbolic, mental 
representations, with the brain conceived of as an input-output 
processor, a problem-solving device running abstract, 
generalised computational programs which enable us to process 
incoming data into a perception/interpretation of the outside 
world. This ‘software’, separate from the body, was equated with 
the mind, while the body was regarded as an output system 
attached to the cognitive processing system, with similar tasks 
achieved by applying the same underlying motor program to 
different effectors: 
1
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corpus ex naturâ suâ sit semper divisibile, mens autem plane 
indivisibilis … mentem a corpore omnino esse diversam.2 
—Descartes (1641) Meditationes de prima philosophia VI;19 
The information-processing approach or computer metaphor has 
become further entrenched over the latter half of the previous 
century due to the adoption of the digital computer as the 
platform to run the symbolic computations (Hoffmann et al., 
n.d.). 
However, this dualist perspective has been increasingly 
challenged, beginning with Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, 
John Dewey, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and it is today widely 
acknowledged that perception and cognition are grounded in 
bodily experience. The brain is not the sole problem-solving 
resource we have at our disposal; the organiser/filtering machine 
is the body-en-total. Heuristics depend on our physiology; 
cognition is not only influenced and biased by states of the body, 
but crucial to it are also the rest of the body beyond the brain, as 
well as the environment. 
Until very recently, most language research has, in a 
Cartesian manner, traditionally regarded linguistic phenomena as 
internal, mental, isolationist and amodal (that is, separate and 
independent from perception, action and emotion systems, and 
the body); a view endorsed in psychology (e.g. Geschwind 1970; 
Kintsch 1998), philosophy (e.g. Katz & Fodor 1963; Fodor 
1983), and linguistics (e.g. early Chomsky – 1957, 1975; Nowak 
et al. 2002; Jackendoff 2002)3. For instance, Chomsky’s most 
seminal theories were based on mathematical formalism and saw 
language as governed by a context-free grammar extended with 
transformational rules operating on (non-semantic) symbol 
strings and complemented by morphophonemic rules, with 
autonomous syntax at the core of the theory of language. The 
reason why his views for a long time did not go beyond such a 
perspective should not come as a surprise. His Syntactic 
Structures, which became a revolutionary and foundational 
work4 in linguistics, grew out of a series of lecture notes for an 
audience of undergrad (mainly electrical engineering and maths) 
students at the MIT.5 Also, Chomsky’s ideas were born at the 
2
 “There is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body 
is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. […] 
the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body.” 
3
 A votum separatum in this domain is the field of biolinguistics, which 
hypothesizes a strong genetic (or neurobiological) endowment for 
language (UG) and determination of its structure (e.g. postulating 
selectional—i.e. evolutionary fitness—advantages), treating the language 
faculty on a par with other biological systems (see e.g. Meader & 
Muyskens 1950; Lenneberg 1967; Piatelli-Palmarini 1989; Hauser et al. 
2002; Chomsky 2005; Di Sciullo & Boeckx 2011). 
4
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same time as the establishment of computer science as a distinct 
academic discipline, the beginnings of computational linguistics, 
and the founding of AI research, which all shared the dominant 
idea that thought can be described with formal logic. 
The generative school inspired several decades of linguistic 
thought, and even theories trying to modify or undermine its 
tenets were still relying on the underlying view of language as a 
system manipulating abstract symbols. This dualistic view could 
lead one into believing that in order to credibly emulate 
linguistic behaviour, it suffices to develop ‘software’ operating 
on (i.e. applying combinatorial rules such as Merge and Move 
to) abstract representations6 that will work on any computational 
machine, and that its operations will be implementation-
independent, functioning identically regardless of the physical 
hardware. 
2 EMBODIED LANGUAGE IN HUMANS 
to turn print into exciting situations in their skulls 
—Kurt Vonnegut Slaughterhouse-Five (1969:205) 
 
The dualistic approach just outlined above works to some extent 
in statistical machine translation, automatic text indexing and 
retrieval (think e.g. search engines), natural-language interfaces 
or dialogue systems, but if the system to be developed is to truly 
mimic human behaviour, the disembodied picture is not very 
accurate for several reasons. One may be doubtful about 
modularity and the existence of a specifically dedicated innate 
language acquisition device, but must still take into account the 
following phenomena and theoretical developments: 
1. lateralization and localization of the language faculty in the 
brain. Linguistic capabilities have been shown to be limited to 
certain areas of the cerebrum, as evidenced primarily by 
various language disorders:7 
 
 receptive aphasia, commonly known as Wernicke’s aphasia 
(Wernicke 1874): damage to the medial temporal lobe de-
stroying local language regions and cutting them off from 
most of the occipital, temporal and parietal regions (cf. e.g. 
Price 2000; Bookheimer 2002; Damasio et al. 2004); 
  expressive aphasia (aka Broca’s or agrammatic aphasia; 
Broca 1861); 
6
 Understood as terminal symbols, which can—subsequently or 
concurrently—be equipped with referential, meaning-bearing properties. 
7
 Theoretically, an injury disrupting the system’s functioning may only 
show the involvement of the affected region, not that the whole 
functionality was due to that region. However, interestingly, not only 
spoken, but also sing language is left-lateralised (with use of classical 
language areas—e.g. Broca’s (Horwitz et al. 2003)—in sentence 
processing and LH damage associated with lexical comprehension, with 
a difference in more posterior activation in areas responsible for 
processing vision and movement; Woll 2012). While signing patients 
with RH damage perform within the normal range on language tests, 
with the exception of tests of locative sentence comprehension, these 
problems appear to mean not linguistic malfunction per se, but an 
indirect consequence of more general cognitive deficits: in areas such as 
classifiers, spatial verbs, and grammar relying on space, sign language 
processing is reliant on visuospatial cognition (ibid.; Woll & Morgan 
2012). 
 
 abnormal language developed in individuals with the left 
hemisphere removed (Dennis & Whitaker 1976);8 
 
 Specific Language Impairment (SLI), which is unrelated to 
other developmental disorders, mental retardation, brain in-
jury, or deafness (e.g. Joanisse & Seidenberg 1998; Bishop 
& Snowling 2004; Archibald & Gathercole 2006); 
  other cases of people with normal nonverbal abilities but 
impaired language, and ‘normal’ language but cognitive 
deficits (cf. the classic case studies of individuals with 
incommensurable linguistic and cognitive capacities: Genie 
(Curtiss 1981), Laura (Yamada 1990), Clive (Smith 1989), 
or Christopher (Smith et al. 1993)9. 
While these deficits cannot straightforwardly be taken as proof 
of the modularity of language (cf. e.g. Calabrette et al. 2003; 
Fodor 2005), they do point to localisation of language processes; 
2. embodiment of language in neuronal circuitry. FMRI studies 
have shown ‘activation’ of certain brain areas involved in 
language processing (e.g. Osterhout 1997; Hagoort et al. 
1999; Embick et al. 2000; Horwitz et al. 2003; Pulvermüller 
& Assadollahi 2007), with different levels of language 
processing identified in specific regions, e.g. loci of syntax 
mainly in left-perisylvian language regions, especially Broca’s 
and Wernicke’s areas, but also adjacent neocortical areas, the 
insula, and subcortical structures including basal ganglia (cf. 
e.g. Ullman 2001; Grodzinsky & Friederici 2006), or 
phonology in the superior temporal sulcus and anterior 
superior temporal cortex (cf. e.g. Diesch et al. 1996; Obleser 
et al. 2006; Uppenkamp et al. 2006); 
3. genetic influence on language. While mutations of the 
Foxhead box protein 2 (FOXP2 gene), deemed to cause a 
severe speech and language disorder (e.g. Lai et al. 2001; 
Vernes et al. 2008; Fisher & Scharff 2009),were initially taken 
as evidence for a ‘language gene’, it was later discovered that 
the protein impacts a wide range of phenotypic features all 
over the body (including facial motor control) and that the 
impairments of the family affected with the mutation went 
beyond language to other cognitive capacities. It is now more 
believed that it is networks of gene interactions rather than 
individual genes that have an influence on language (Knopka 
et al. 2009), but the neurobiological influence is there; 
4. many Universal Grammar-based constraints now being 
reinterpreted as learning and processing constraints. That is, 
the difficulty in the acquisition of certain aspects of language 
are being accounted for by their complexity, the 
computational load under which the user/learner operates, 
his/her memory and attention limitations, or ease of access to 
8
 Although one must be cautious about the conclusions since the cortical 
development in the subjects of the study was not normal in the first place 
(Chomsky 1980:264). 
9
 In short, Christopher was able to acquire natural languages (with great 
aptitude, too, especially regarding morphology), but not ones violating 
the constraints of Universal Grammar. (The picture is more complex, but 
does not invalidate the basic claim.) But see e.g. Karmiloff-Smith 
(1998), Johnson et al. (1999), or Elsabbagh & Karmiloff-Smith (2006) 
for reports on Williams syndrome questioning evidence for a clear-cut 
dissociation of innate mechanisms for language. While the syndrome 
was originally postulated as characterised by preserved language in the 
presence of marked visual-spatial impairments, hence as evidence for 
modularity (cf. e.g. Bellugi et al. 1988, 1994), it was subsequently 
observed that actually language is not wholly intact (e.g. involving 
prepositional errors; Rubba & Klima 1991, Capirci et al. 1996, Volterra 
et al. 1996; Karmiloff-Smith et al. 2003; Woll 2012). 
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representations (cf. e.g. Wakabayashi 2002; Van Hell & De 
; 
5. maturation and the critical/sensitive period10 (but consider 
e.g. Marinova-Todd et al. 2000 for a contradictory view); 
6. the Chomskyan competence vs. performance distinction 
(Chomsky 1965)11, explaining mistakes in (originally native) 
language users’ output (i.e., their actual deployment of the 
linguistic capacity) attributable to such psychosomatic states 
and factors affecting them as fatigue, tedium, intoxication, 
drugs, sudden changes of mind, haste, inattention, or external 
distractions; 
7. interaction between (context-bound) language comprehension 
and production, and sensorimotor activation, manifested in 
both directions by:12 
  motor resonance observed in linguistic (Lakoff & Johnson 
1980; Lakoff 1987), behavioural (primarily with priming13 
modulating motor performance; e.g. Tanenhaus et al. 1995; 
Gentilucci et al. 2000; Spivey et al. 2001; Glenberg & 
Kaschak 2002; Glover et al. 2004;  Buccino et al. 2005; 
Boulenger et al. 2008; Nazir et al. 2008; Frak et al. 2010; 
for grammar cf. Madden & Zwaan 2003; Bergen & Wheeler 
2010), neuroimaging and TMS studies14 (e.g. Zatorre et al. 
10
 The Critical Period Hypothesis (or its idea), proposed by Penfield and 
Roberts (1959), posits the existence of an ideal window of time during 
which genetically endowed language acquisition can—given adequate 
stimuli—take place spontaneously, relatively effortlessly, and 
characteristically meeting a high degree of success, after which acquiring 
a language naturally, automatically and with complete ultimate 
attainment becomes impossible. “The earlier the better” rule of thumb 
captures the negative correlation between the age of acquisition onset 
and subsequent asymptotic attainment. Most evidence to support the 
claim was supplied by Eric Lenneberg (1967) in his Biological 
Foundations of Language. While the existence of a critical period is 
widely accepted where first language acquisition is concerned, attempts 
to extend it to second language acquisition still arouse a good deal of 
contention (for instance, Lamendella (1977) suggested the term 
‘sensitive period’ to emphasise the fact that acquisition may be more 
efficient during childhood, but not restricted to that period). 
11
 The distinction can be considered on the example of any organic 
system: “Studies of the digestive system, for example, distinguish 
between its structural properties and what it is doing after you ate a 
sandwich” (Noam Chomsky, p.c., 8 Nov 2011), and can actually be 
 
12
 This seems to be a reflection of a more general phenomenon where 
“there is no animal in which there is known to be a complete segregation 
of sensory processing” (Stein et al. 1996:497). 
13
 E.g. in the form of mention of tool and action concepts. 
14
 Somewhat importantly, motor resonance was not observed when the 
stimuli were used in idiomatic contexts (Rueschemeyer et al. 2010a) or 
metaphorical ones. Regarding the latter, Raposo et al. (2009) found 
activity in the pre- and motor cortex for literal-only usages of arm- and 
leg-related Vs, while Bergen et al. (2007) likewise demonstrated that 
visual imagery is triggered in sentence comprehension tasks (where 
general words of motion were employed) only where the utterances have 
literal spatial meaning. However, the picture is not completely clear-cut. 
This year, Lacey et al. (2012) showed that textural metaphors do activate 
parietal operculum regions important to the sense of touch. To explain 
this discrepancy, one could posit a qualitative difference between 
‘directly’ embodied sensory experiences (e.g. texture or temperature) and 
more ‘indirect’ ones such as those grounded in visual perception. The 
former are more ‘primary’: 
i)sensed earliest – already in the womb, tactition being the first sense 
that begins to develop before 8 weeks gestational age together with 
the emergence of the nervous system (Montagu 1978), before taste 
1992; Fadiga et al. 2002; Tettamanti et al. 2008; Fischer & 
Zwaan 2008; Kemmerer et al. 2008; Boulenger et al. 2009; 
Willems et al. 2010; for activation in visual areas cf. Martin 
et al. 1996; Pulvermüller & Hauk 2006; Simmons et al. 
2007; in the olfactory cortex cf. González et al. 2006); 
  semantic resonance (brain language areas getting activated 
during sensorimotor action; Bonda et al. 1994; 
Pulvermüller et al. 2005; Rueschemeyer et al. 2010);15 
 
 verbalization of memory facilitated when assuming the 
original body position during recall (Dijkstra et al. 2007)16, 
linguistic tasks expedited when accompanied by action 
(Rieser et al. 1994), and sensorimotor experiences 
intertwined with cognition in episodic memory (Pfeifer 
2011); 
  faster comprehension of depictions of spatial associations 
than of descriptions of spatial dissociations17 (Glenberg et 
al. 1987); speedier recognition of words with ‘body-object 
interaction’ than of ones without (Siakaluk et al. 2008); 
  semantic interference and facilitation in the Stroop effect 
(longer RTs needed to name colour names written in 
incongruent ink hue; Jaensch 1929; Stroop 1935); 
 
 clinical studies indicating that processing of action concepts 
degrades if action- or vision-related brain areas are lesioned 
in motor neuron diseases (Damasio et al. 1996; Bak et al. 
2001; Neininger & Pulvermüller 2003) and semantic 
dementia (Pulvermüller et al. 2010); 
 
 comprehension of action words deteriorating after loss of 
procedural knowledge (cf. Boulenger et al. 2008 on 
Parkinson’s disease patients; also Bak et al. 2006); 
8. parallel emergence of speech and gesture in infancy (Iverson 
& Thelen 1999); 
9. co-speech gesture reducing cognitive load (Goldin-Meadow et 
al. 2001), and indications of a dual-task advantage for bimodal 
(signed-spoken) language production (i.e., production of code-
blends, with elements of the signed and spoken languages 
appearing simultaneously; Kaufmann & Kaul 2012); or 
10. Conceptual Blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner 
2002) explaining language creativity as a semantic process 
operating on the output of perception and interaction with the 
world to create new structures. 
Thus, independently of theoretical persuasion, without taking 
into account both the architecture of the human brain, and 
and smell (14 weeks g.a.), hearing (16 weeks g.a.; Shahidullah & 
Hepper 1992) or vision (week 18 onwards), 
ii)available in more ‘primitive’ organisms without vision or hearing, 
iii)perceptible during half-sleep, and  
iv)impacting our bodily functioning more strongly (the somatic reaction 
to extremely high or low temperatures, pressure or skin irritation is 
more likely to be stronger than e.g. to an unpleasant sight or sound). 
This might account for the lack of activation in visual cortical areas. 
15
 But see e.g. Bedny et al. (2008), Postle et al. (2008), or Kemmerer & 
Gonzalez-Castillo (2010) for opposing views. 
16
 This conviction can also be found in ‘folk wisdom’. For instance, in 
one episode of a Malaysian edutainment program for children which I 
was consulting on for a European broadcaster, a monkey was hanging 
upside down because that was the position in which she last saw her 
orange juice. 
17
 I.e. texts describing an event in which the main character was spatially 
dissociated from a target object, e.g.: 
John was preparing for a marathon in August. After 
doing a few warm-up exercises, he took off his 
sweatshirt and went jogging. (emph.added) 
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embodiment—the interaction of the language faculty with the 
sensory apparatus and motor system—it is unrealistic to replicate 
accurately the processes which take place during language 
acquisition, comprehension, or production, or during non-
linguistic actions. Cognitive mechanisms are synergistically 
intertwined with affective and somatic components, and largely 
inseparable (Ziemke 2011).  
3 THE COROLLARIES FOR ROBOTICS  
… it is the movement which is primary, and the sensation which 
is secondary, the movement of the body, head, and eye muscles 
determine the quality of what is experienced.  
In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing;  
it is looking, and not a sensation of light. 
—John Dewey (1896:358f.) 
 
Since the official launch of AI as a new research discipline at the 
seminal Dartmouth conference in 1956, much of work in the 
field has been driven by the ‘Physical Symbol Hypothesis’ 
(Newell & Simon 1976): trying to construct systems that would 
possess or build internal, symbolic representations of objects and 
relations in the outside world—in other words, a “world 
model”—which usually had little to do with their hardware, 
sensorimotor experience, or current context18, but were instead 
characterised by precisely defined states and finite lists of 
acceptable commands (Wang 2009:2f.). Under such a 
functionalist approach, the body is merely a platform on which 
cognitive operations are running. In some areas, such closed 
systems were able to achieve spectacular feats, for instance in 
defeating world chess champions. 
Chess, however, is a formal game, set in a virtual world with 
discrete states, positions, and licit moves, a game involving 
complete information, and a static one: no move means no 
change, and the inventory of legitimate operations remains 
constant (Pfeifer & Scheier 1999:58ff.). This is quite unlike what 
usually happens in the real world. Hence, the last two and a half 
decades have witnessed recurrent appeals for situated, embodied 
autonomous systems actively and directly interacting with the 
world around (cf. op. cit.; Brooks 1991; Varela et al. 1991) and 
constructing knowledge via this dynamic enactment (the active 
learning being qualitatively different from statistical machine 
learning; cf. e.g Froese 2009; Vernon 2010). Evidently robots, 
even anthropomorphic ones, are far from isomorphic with 
humans in terms of both the ‘brain’ and the rest of the body, 
including the input and output devices (sensors and actuators). 
Also, as one reviewer rightly remarks, in the language 
technology field priority is not necessarily to make a machine as 
humanlike as possible, with the same architecture; rather, it is to 
make the machine so that it does things on a level comparable to 
humans (or, I would add, surpassing that) – in other words, to 
achieve similar—or better—functionality in terms of mode, 
scope, or scale. Or, going completely beyond the anthropocentric 
GOFAI perspective (Haugeland 1985; cf. Wang 2008), since 
passing the Turing Test is not a sine qua non of being intelligent, 
18
 The fact that the appropriate relations to some outside world could be 
established by the system’s designer or end-user becomes unhelpful the 
moment we want to deal with an autonomous agent, with the human 
interpreter removed from the loop, as emphasised by Steven Harnad in 
his seminal (1990) paper (cf. also Pfeifer & Scheier 1999:69f.). 
as acknowledged by the test’s designer himself (Turing 1950). 
This, however, means that robust artificial cognitive agents can 
bypass the human limitations19 inherent in most of the above 
points (just as they could overcome some contingencies resulting 
from the material properties of the human brain and bodily 
features such as synaptic speed and efficiency, the physical 
characteristics of the vocal tract, the auditory perception system, 
or muscular flexibility20). Nevertheless, they could still benefit 
from strengthened associative connections owing to the motor 
and semantic resonance in both the optimization of their 
processes, and reactivity and sensitivity to environmental 
stimuli, across a range of tasks: 
(i) in grounded language understanding (cf. e.g. Glenberg & 
Kaschak 2002; Feldman & Narayanan 2004; Gallese & 
Lakoff 2005; Sato et al. 2008), where structuring the 
environment acts as scaffolding21 and all inputs contribute 
to evidential support, 
(ii) in automated articulation-based speech recognition 
(utilising motor information, i.e. combining spoken input 
with visual data—e.g. the shape of the speakers lips—and 
maybe even data such as strength of the incoming 
airstream), 
(iii) while learning about context-dependent phenomena in 
the surrounding world (e.g. action sequences and argument 
structure in construction grammar; cf. Dominey 2007; 
since embodiment plays a constitutive role in the process 
of cognition; Vernon 2010), or in the process of language 
acquisition in general (because language—at least in the 
initial stages—is acquired by situated embodied direct 
engagement with the world, and not just passive 
perception, e.g. watching television; cf. e.g. Steels 2009), 
(iv) to help with storage and retrieval due to the benefits of 
episodic memory, 
(v) to support action prediction, planning and anticipation 
(Koelewijn et al. 2008; Stapel et al. 2010; van Elk et al. 
2010)22, including prediction of the next sensory feedback, 
(vi) to support action execution (with linguistic input 
making the actor better aware of the affordances, i.e. 
physically feasible action possibilities), and  
(vii) to reinforce feedback in ‘soft robotics’ and 
morphological computation, where there is no clear 
separation between the controller (or orchestrator) and the 
hardware (morphology), and the tasks are distributed 
between the brain, body, and environment (cf. e.g. Paul 
19
 The limitations need not in themselves necessarily be a bad thing; to 
the contrary, they may serve a useful role in limiting the search space 
and focusing attention on the most vital stimuli. The restrictions imposed 
on the vocal apparatus in turn mean that speech is segmented and 
decelerated enough to facilitate comprehension. The relative absence of 
such constraints on computers may be the exact reason why the latter 
have problems tackling tasks where humans perform with ease (Tom 
Froese, p.c., 9 Mar 2012). 
20
 Just as robots can have an advantage when equipped with e.g. infrared, 
or ultrasonic sensors. 
21
 Sensorimotor dynamics plays a crucial part in toddlers’ learning to 
categorise objects: it is only when the infant brings the object in front of 
their eyes and focuses on it that s/he learns to associate it with its name 
(Smith 2010). 
22
 Though originally grounded in sensorimotor experience, mental 
imagery, or simulation of interaction with the world, may subsequently 
become environmentally decoupled, as in forward models (Clark & 
Grush 1999). 
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2004; Pfeifer 2011; which also has the aim of off-loading 
computation; Di Paolo 2009);23 
(viii) in cognitive developmental robotics, aiming at 
understanding human cognitive developmental processes 
by synthetic or constructive approaches (Asada et al. 2009, 
Asada 2011, Ishiguro et al. 2011); 
(ix) in common grounding and alignment, which are 
crucial for fruitful situated human-machine interaction, and 
which are another area where sensory experience must be 
coordinated with linguistic interaction. 
Principally, if our goal were to create machines which do 
things on a comparable level to—or surpassing—humans, we 
could do away with attempts at embodying them in human-
inspired ways (Taivo Lints, p.c., 31 May 2012) – they could 
function perfectly well with totally nonhuman kinds of 
embodiment (different ‘bodies’, different sensors and effectors, 
different internal architectures... or even with embodiment in a 
virtual world; Bringsjord et al. 2008; Goertzel et al. 2008). 
Given the role played by the morphology of the sensory 
apparatus and the architecture of the sensorimotor loop in 
shaping and structuring the information that reaches the 
controller, and thereby in concept formation, it would anyway be 
difficult for a machine to form the same concepts, categories and 
behaviours as us without having comparable morphology (as 
remarked e.g. by Barsalou 1999 or Lakoff & Johnson 1998). 
However, if our goal is to have machines ‘thinking’ and 
behaving in a way compatible with ours—which is a highly 
practical and desirable goal—then it is of high importance for 
them to develop, learn and function in a similar “experience 
space” (Taivo Lints, p.c.; cf. also Wang 2009:5). 
The requirement that the behaviour, perception and 
conceptual apparatus of artificial intelligent agents be grounded 
in their experience of their own interaction with the outside 
world at once means that their concepts and categories need not 
necessarily rely on the same minimal constituents and 
grammatical categories as have been externally identified and 
defined in linguistics. Instead, the gradually emergent categories 
are more likely to be intrinsically meaningful behaviours and 
affordances (see also Kuniyoshi et al. 2004), action-oriented 
rather than orbocentric (Hoffmann & Pfeifer 2011). For instance, 
to a robot who has never kicked or observed anyone kick 
anything but footballs, the minimal unit of meaning may be 
<kick a ball> rather than <kick> alone (although this does not 
rule out the possibility of extrapolation and abstraction should a 
relevant opportunity arise).24 Similarly, irrespective of whether 
the input is expressed using [NP kicking a ball] or [VP kick a ball], 
it should activate the same action schema. 
4 TOWARDS A BROADER DEFINITION OF 
MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION 
23
 The idea of morphological computation in animals can be well 
illustrated on the example of cockroaches skilfully climbing over 
obstacles that exceed their body height, using relatively few neurons, off-
loading most tasks to morphology (by reconfiguring the mesothoracic 
shoulder joint), exploiting mechanical change and feedback, and 
capitalising on the stability of the local feedback circuits; cf. Watson et 
al. 2002; Pfeifer et al. 2007; Pfeifer & Gomez 2009). 
24
 See for instance the POETICON++ project (Robots need Language: A 
computational mechanism for generalisation & generation of new 
behaviours in robots; http://www.poeticon.eu/). 
In order to form a meaningful experience and construct coherent, 
reliable and robust representations of the surrounding world, the 
human brain combines prior knowledge with sensory input 
arriving from various modalities and integrates these at multiple 
levels of the neuraxis. This serves to maximize the efficiency of 
everyday performance and learning, enhancing the salience of 
the events, helping increase the detection and identification of 
the external stimuli, disambiguate them, compensate for 
incomplete information, and shorten reaction times. In view of 
the inseparability of language and the body, the concept of 
multisensory integration—whether in natural or artificial 
cognitive agents—should be extended and cover both the 
linguistic input and the complementary information that the 
brain combines from temporally coincident sensory impressions. 
This does not mean that we should ‘dumb down’ the statistical 
processes where they operate successfully; instead, where the 
input stream in one channel is too noisy, turning on auxiliary 
channels25 and interacting with the environment in an active 
manner may generate ancillary data and help e.g. disambiguate 
the signal and take the right decision (see also Pfeifer & Scheier 
1997; Beer 2003).26 An added benefit would then be 
significantly reduced programming costs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its effective 
embodied action in the world actually constitutes its perception 
and thereby grounds its cognition. 
—Stewart, Gapenne & Di Paolo (2010:vii) 
 
I have started out with a brief depiction of the dualistic Cartesian 
approach that has characterised much of twentieth-century 
thought, including that underlying most of traditional AI. While 
adherence to such an outlook has in many domains led to very 
spectacular achievements, there are limits which purely symbolic 
systems cannot overcome. While the subject of the mind-body 
relationship is by no means new, the link, still very often ignored 
by cognitive science communities (logic, linguistics, computer 
science) may be the key element for bypassing the present 
limitations of AI systems. 
Language, too, has for a long time been treated across 
scientific domains as an abstract system operating largely 
independently from the body (articulatory-perceptual organs 
notwithstanding). I have presented an inventory of 
heterogeneous evidence against such a view, addressing instead 
the issue of the link between language and body. While many of 
the embodied language phenomena specific to humans have little 
25
 These channels need not all be active at all times, especially when it 
might burden the cognitive load in non-essential tasks, when conflicting 
inputs can bring the machine to a halt, or when the benefits—e.g. in 
terms of speed—would be negligible (Richard Littauer, p.c., 26 May 
2012). The system’s available resources should be dynamically allocated 
to different tasks in such a way as to achieve the highest overall 
efficiency. 
26
 One consequence for humans may be that the role of kinaesthetic 
modality, traditionally largely believed to dominate in children, but be 
negligible in adults (cf. e.g. Barbe & Milone 1981; Felder & Spurlin 
2005), should be reassessed, as the effectiveness may be demonstrated of 
‘learning-by-doing’ and task-based approaches to language learning and 
teaching where the students have to use their bodies (e.g. when acquiring 
novel lexis via common cookery classes). 
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direct translation to machines, there are others that can profitably 
be exploited and inspire the development of robust artificial 
autonomous agents that rely on semantics grounded in their past 
experience (both linguistic and non-verbal) as well as possible 
related operations on the concepts concerned. Agents which are 
adaptive to feedback and can, despite insufficient knowledge, 
time pressure and storage space constraints safely and 
successfully navigate, learn, and communicate in the complex 
and dynamic ecological niche they share with human actors. 
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